Organisation

Centre for International Finance and Regulation


The Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) was a Centre of Excellence operating from 2011 to 2016 to address fundamental issues affecting the Australian financial industry. CIFR’s mission was to promote financial sector vibrancy, resilience and integrity, supporting Australia as a regional financial centre through leading research and education on systemic risk, market and regulatory performance and financial market developments. CIFR funded 71 research projects, involving well over 100 researchers from domestic and international universities.

For Australia’s financial industry, CIFR provided a strategic link between academia, policy-makers, regulators and other industry participants.  Now closed, the Centre's output of 148 papers are all available at this publisher page.

Working paper

The regulation of mobile money in Malawi


This report is the result of a study undertaken in late 2013 on Malawi’s legal and regulatory framework for mobile money. The study was commissioned by the MM4P and conducted in consultation with the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM).
Working paper

Valuation of Systematic Risk in the Cross-Section of Credit Default Swap Spreads


This paper analyses the pricing of systematic risk factors in credit default swap contracts in a two-stage empirical framework. In the first pass, we estimate contract specific sensitivities to several systematic risk factors by time-series regressions using quoted credit default swap (CDS) spreads of 339 U.S. entities from 2004 to 2010. We find that the...
Working paper

Decomposing the smile: systematic credit risk in mortgage Portfolios


This study analyzes systematic and non-systematic credit risk in mortgage portfolios given US loan-level information by controlling for time-varying observable information in relation to the borrower, the collateral and the macro economy. The total risk in relation to rating class default rates is decomposed into systematic and class-specic non-systematic risk by a state space model...
Working paper

Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision


It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in which the agent is privately informed about which...

ADVERTISEMENT